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Opening the Creative Mind of High Need
for Cognitive Closure Individuals through
Activation of Uncreative Ideas
Lay See Ong and Angela K.-Y. Leung
Singapore Management University
Drawing on the integrative system theory of creativity combining the person, process,
and press perspectives, this research offers the ﬁrst evidence of how high-need-for-
cognitive-closure (NFC) individuals’ creative mind can be opened up, by making them
become more cognizant of uncreative ideas as consensually invalid solutions to creative
problems. A validation study was conducted to ﬁrst establish the utility of a newly
developed chocolate design task. In the second study, half of the participants were made
aware of conventional chocolate designs by drawing these designs before generating a
revolutionized design of chocolate; the other half did not have to draw out the conven-
tional designs ﬁrst. Results conﬁrmed that, given the opportunity to cognize uncreative
solutions, high-NFC participants who had a higher creative ideation potential became
the most creative. Their low-NFC counterparts, however, did not seem to beneﬁt from
the trigger of uncreative solutions. The implication that holding onto a chronic motive
to attain cognitive closure or epistemic certainty is not necessarily detrimental to
creative performance was discussed.
Minds are like parachutes—they function only when
open.—(James Dewar: Knowles, 2009)
Creativity is a highly prized skill. Its counterpart,
innovation, responsible for overseeing the production
and implementation of creative ideas, is often well
sought after too. For instance, the US Environmental
Protection Agency had earlier called for crowdsourcing
of out-of-the-box innovative solutions for cleaning up
BP’s 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico (United States
Environmental Protection Agency, 2011). CEOs of mul-
tinational corporations identiﬁed creativity as the most
crucial factor for dealing with massive global shifts in
business models and consumer demands (Tomasco,
2010). Even in daily life, individuals contemplate on
what creative fusion dishes to make when hosting a din-
ner party or how to add creative elements to their living
space to create a hint of postmodernism. Undoubtedly,
creativity is a valuable asset. It aids everyday transac-
tions, as well as more global and pressing problems.
In the last 2 decades, the psychological science of crea-
tivity research has greatly advanced the ﬁeld’s understand-
ing of creativity, the phenomenon that some people might
perceive as mysterious or experience as a magical aha
moment where sudden creative insight leap into the con-
sciousness. The system theory of creativity studies the
notion of creativity as a multifaceted construct, encom-
passing the person (e.g., creative predispositions), process
(e.g., creativity-enhancing cognitive and motivational
processes), and press (e.g., situational circumstances that
inﬂuence creativity) perspectives in its investigations
(Horn & Salvendy, 2006; Rhodes, 1961; Richards,
1999). Drawing upon this integrative framework, this
article provides the ﬁrst evidence that a high need for cog-
nitive closure (NFC) is not always creativity dampening,
as previous research has found (e.g., Ford & Kruglanski,
1995; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). To understand the
potential facilitative effect of cognitive closure on creativ-
ity, this article starts by outlining how the epistemic need
for attaining cognitive closure motivates information
search and processing for problem solving.
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NFC AND ADHERENCE TO
CONVENTIONALIZED NORMS
Conceptualized by Kruglanski (1990), NFC is an
epistemic motivational tendency to seize and freeze on
ideas that come to mind early and easily. This leads to
high-NFC individuals relying more on conventionalized
norms and established knowledge, as they can afford a
consensually valid interpretive frame to make sense of
problems and arrive at ﬁrm answers (e.g., Chiu, Morris,
Hong, & Menon, 2000; Ford & Kruglanski, 1995;
Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). Individuals with high levels
of NFC often experience an acute need for epistemic
certainty, which is a motivated state to maintain high
conﬁdence in their chosen solution or course of action
as correct. Once settled with the presumably best sol-
ution or action, they are less likely to seek out alternative
solutions or entertain diverse perspectives, thereby ham-
pering their creativity. Interestingly, Chirumbolo and
colleagues (Chirumbolo, Livi, Mannetti, Pierro, &
Kruglanski, 2004; Chirumbolo, Mannetti, Pierro, Areni,
& Kruglanski, 2005) reasoned that this lack of
exploration of alternative solutions, due to the need to
be highly certain at the one best solution, is what restricts
a high NFC individual’s ideational ﬂuidity,1 resulting in
lower number of ideas generated.
Research evidence speaks to these propositions. In
a series of studies, Fu and colleagues (2007) showed that
conformity to the familiar cultural norms is an important
source of closure provider with high consensual validity,
particularly relevant for people high in NFC (see also
Chirumbolo et al., 2004; Chirumbolo et al., 2005). In
another study, it was found that among both American
and Hong Kong Chinese college students, those with
higher levels of NFC were less likely to access norma-
tively inaccessible exemplars in a conceptual domain.
For example, they were more likely to generate doctor,
a normatively accessible exemplar for the conceptual
domain of occupation, but not a normatively inaccess-
ible exemplar such as optician (Ip, Chen, & Chiu, 2006).
Given these ﬁndings, it follows that if high-NFC indi-
viduals are less open to unfamiliar foreign conventions
and normatively inaccessible ideas, they will be less
likely to capture the creative beneﬁts by appropriating
intellectual resources from other cultural sources.
A recent study by Leung and Chiu (2010) tested
this hypothesis. To examine how receptive American
students, with different degrees of multicultural
experiences, were to foreign ideas, the researchers had
them develop an improvised idea about happiness into
a creative one by allowing them to sample a limited
number of foreign and local happiness-related sayings.
Participants, randomly selected, were either put in
a high or low time pressure situation when performing
the creative expansion task. The high time pressure set-
ting was one that participants were constantly reminded
to keep to the time, a standard procedure to temporarily
activate a greater NFC; the low time pressure setting
imposed no time constraint on completing the task.
As predicted, among participants with more multi-
cultural experiences, those who were induced a lower
level of NFC under low time pressure were less likely
to freeze on familiar local sayings and more likely to
recruit foreign sayings to creatively expand the impro-
vised idea. Under high time pressure, however, even
individuals with multicultural experiences were unmoti-
vated to seek out foreign ideas to inspire their creativity.
HIGH NFC: ESCHEWING THE INVALID AND
SEIZING ON THE VALID CLOSURE
PROVIDER
As discussed, widely shared norms and knowledge in
one’s familiar culture provides people a consensually
validated way to approach problems. However, the same
set of norms and knowledge might no longer be
applicable as a valid closure provider in a foreign cultural
context. It is thus reasonable to argue that individuals
with higher needs for epistemic closure would be parti-
cularly sensitive to, and adhere more to, local conven-
tions when they are navigating in different cultural
contexts. In other words, they would readily reorganize
their epistemic strategy to seize on a new set of consen-
sually valid knowledge when they are in a foreign culture,
even though this set of knowledge schema is deemed
consensually invalid in their own culture.
There is general support for this contention. In a ser-
ies of studies, Kosic, Kruglanski, Pierro, and Mannetti
(2004) investigated the acculturation strategies of immi-
grants in Rome, Italy, and also assessed their individual
NFC. The researchers argued that when immigrants ﬁrst
settle in the host country, their initial reference group
upon arrival serves as an important closure provider
to ease their epistemic uncertainty. For the new immi-
grants who indicated that their initial reference group
was made up of mainly their co-ethnics, those with
higher (vs. lower) levels of NFC were more inclined to
still adhere to the norms in their native culture and
assimilate less slowly to the Italian culture. The reverse
was true for the immigrants whose initial reference
group was made up of mainly host nationals (i.e.,
Italians), with those having higher (vs. lower) levels of
1Although ideational ﬂuidity described here is seemingly similar to
ideational ﬂuency, it encompasses more than the ability to generate
a large number of ideas. Our understanding of ideational ﬂuidity in
Chirumbolo and colleagues (2004) follows that of Slepian and Ambady
(2012), where ideational ﬂuidity encompasses ﬂexibility and the ﬂow of
creative thoughts.
































NFC adhered more strongly to local Italian cultural
norms and better integrated into the host country.
Another study by Chao, Zhang, and Chiu (2010)
provided further evidence. In the study, European
American students were asked to assume the role of a
drug store manager handling a health dispute between
a pharmacist and a customer in one scenario and assume
the role of a department head handling a research
authorship dispute between two university professors
in another. The conﬂicts either happened in the United
States, where the store manager and department head
were currently working, or in China where they had
been recently relocated. A pretest established that
American students were aware of the differential
cultural norms of conﬂict resolution in American and
Chinese contexts, with Americans more likely to seek
out diagnostic information for ﬁnding out the truth
and Chinese more likely to seek out relational infor-
mation for analyzing possible consequences that impact
the intricate relationships among different parties. As
expected, high (vs. low) NFC participants were more
likely to follow the prescribed norms in the local culture;
they tended to seek out more diagnostic information
if the conﬂict took place in the United States and
seek out more relational information if the conﬂict took
place in China.
Overall, research ﬁndings are suggestive of high-NFC
individuals’ tendencies to approach problems and to
make sense of everyday experience in a consensually
valid way that is largely context-dependent. In this light,
our research proposes a way to open up the creative
mind of high-NFC individuals by making them aware
of those uncreative ideas as consensually invalid
solutions. Thus, it is hypothesized that if high-NFC
individuals are led to cognize uncreative ideas when
working on a creative task, they will come to better rea-
lize that such uncreative ideas are consensually invalid
closure providers to the problem and will, therefore,
generate more deﬁnite creative answers to attain valid
closure to the task. Further, it is hypothesized that this
creative-mind opening hypothesis will be more pro-
nounced among high-NFC individuals who possess a
higher creative predisposition. It is because after
bringing into awareness those uncreative solutions, the
creative nature of high-NFC individuals might further
aid their creative generations.
STUDY 1
Study 1 was a pilot study, with the purpose of
validating a newly developed chocolate design task.
This task was aimed to provide an easily coded




This study was conducted in a university in Singapore.
Using the university’s subject pool system, 35 undergrad-
uate students (29 women; M age¼ 20.68, SD¼ 1.12)
were recruited for this study and received course credits.
Of the participants, 82.9% were Chinese; the others were
Malay (2.9%), Indian (2.9%), Caucasian (2.9%), or
mixed races (8.7%). Before the start of the study,
participants read and signed the informed consent form.
Procedure and Measures
Participants completed a survey booklet, which
contained a creativity task (chocolate design task), the
Need for Cognitive Closure Scale, the Openness to
Experience Scale, the Runco Ideational Behavior Scale,
and a demographics questionnaire.
Chocolate design task. In this creativity task,
participants were asked to draw a creative chocolate
design. They read the following instruction, which was
partly adopted from Vadino’s (2006) article:
In light of revolution, chocolate confectioners are
starting to move their designs away from traditional
chocolate. ‘‘Chocolate in Belgium is an icon, like pasta
in Italy. But why do we feel obliged by tradition? We
must disturb the traditional shapes. We must create
new combinations, new ingredients,’’ says Giovanna
Massini, a researcher who is leading this chocolate design
initiative in Brussels, Belgium. Suppose you are a
member of Giovanna’s research lab; your task is to
revolutionize the design of chocolate.
Participants then drew one new chocolate design in the
space provided. The task took approximately 10min.
Two independent coders, blind to the research
purpose, coded the drawings across different design
domains. These domains include: (a) the chocolate is of
unconventional overall shape (e.g., a microphone shaped
chocolate), (b) the presence of unconventional shape
within the chocolate itself (e.g., shapes of eyes and nose
on the chocolate), (c) the presence of nonchocolate edible
ingredients (e.g., chili), (d) the presence of inedible
ingredients (e.g., photograph), (e) whether the design
implicates unconventional matter states of chocolate
(e.g., chewable chocolate), (f) the presence of an
additional function the chocolate serves (e.g., a greeting
card made out of chocolate), (g) the presence of a ﬁlled
center (e.g., ﬁlled with syrup), and (h) whether there is
an elaboration about the ﬁlling (e.g., the ﬁlling contains
milk, caramel, or liquor). A creativity score (ranging
from 0 to 8; interrater agreement¼ .84) was derived by
































summing the points scored from each domain, with a
higher score representing a chocolate design that
deviated more from the conventional design. Coding
inconsistencies were identiﬁed by domain and a third
coder recoded them. These are then settled by taking
the domain score that was agreed by two out of the three
coders and used to compute the composite score.
Notably, this task relied on a relatively objective
approach to assess creativity as coders mainly identiﬁed
the presence or absence of each unconventional
attribute.
As a cross-validation of this objectively coded crea-
tivity score, after completing the coding of all designs,
the coders also judged the overall creativity level of each
drawing based on their subjective evaluation on a scale
from 1 (not creative at all) to 7 (extremely creative).
Interrater reliability was moderately high (r¼ .55). The
two measures of creativity were positively correlated
(r¼ .64, p¼ .01).
Runco ideational behavior scale. To test for conver-
gent validity of the chocolate design task, the creative
ideation scale (Runco, Plucker, & Lim, 2001) was used,
which describes actual behaviors that clearly reﬂect an
individual’s use of, appreciation of, and skill with cre-
ative ideas. The scale contains 23 items (e.g., ‘‘I often
get excited by my own new ideas;’’ Cronbach’s a¼ .91)
presented with a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1
(never) to 5 (very often). A positive correlation between
ideational creativity and creative performance on the
chocolate design task was expected.
Need for cognitive closure scale. As a discriminant
validity test of the task, the 8-item close-mindedness sub-
scale of the NFC Scale was used (Kruglanski, Webster, &
Klem, 1993). A sample item is ‘‘I dislike questions which
could be answered in many different ways’’ (Cronbach’s
a¼ .59) and is answered with a 6-point Likert scale
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).
As it is reasonable to argue that individuals who can
come up with a new chocolate design are less likely to
be close-minded, it was predicted that the correlation
between close-mindedness and creative task performance
is moderately (but not strongly) negative.
Openness to experience scale. Taken from the
NEO-Five Factor Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1992),
this 12-item subscale is answered with a 5-point Likert
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly
agree). Participants answered questions such as ‘‘I often
try new and foreign foods’’ (Cronbach’s a¼ .64).
Previous research documented that creative individuals
tend to be more open to new experiences (e.g., Feist,
1998; King, Walker, & Broyles, 1996), therefore a
moderately positive correlation between openness and
creative performance was expected.
Results
The analyses reported here were not tests of hypotheses
but tests of validity. As expected, there was a positive
correlation between the Runco Ideational score and the
creativity coded score of the chocolate design (r¼ .28).
Also, the creativity coded score was negatively correlated
with close-mindedness (r¼.38), and mildly positively
correlated with openness to experience (r¼ .12). On the
whole, both convergent and discriminant validities were
established for the chocolate design task, which was
adopted in Study 2.
STUDY 2
With the chocolate design task validated, the main study
was conducted to test the person process press
interaction predicting that high-NFC individuals, whose
motivation to attain consensually valid solutions is
strong (process), can perform creatively if they are led
to be aware of uncreative solutions (press) and have
the capacity to produce creative products (person).
Method
Participants
Through the university’s subject pool system, 56
undergraduate students were recruited at a Singapore
university (33 women; M age¼ 22.36, SD¼ 1.55). In
the sample, 85.7% of the participants were of Chinese
ethnicity, the rest were Indian (1.8%), Vietnamese
(7.1%), Filipino (3.6%), or Cambodian (1.8%). Parti-
cipants received course credits for their participation.
Before the study began, all participants read and signed
the informed consent form.
Procedure and Measures
Participants completed a survey booklet, which con-
tained the chocolate design task, the Runco Ideational
Behavior Scale, the abridged Need for Cognitive
Closure Scale, and a demographic questionnaire.
Chocolate design task. After reading the same
instruction of the chocolate design task used in Study
1, participants were randomly assigned to one of the
two conditions. Participants in the uncreative-cognizant
condition were ﬁrst told to recall and draw what
they thought were commonly agreed upon conventional
































designs of chocolate before drawing their creative
chocolate design; participants in the uncreative-
incognizant condition were only told to draw their
creative chocolate design. The scoring procedure was
the same as Study 1. The coded scores had high inter-
rater agreement (percentage agreement¼ .91) and a third
coder resolved the few inconsistencies.
Runco ideational behavior scale. To measure
individuals’ creative potential, the same creative idea-
tional scale in Study 1 was used (Cronbach’s a¼ .92).
Need for cognitive closure scale. An abridged NFC
scale (Roets & Hiel, 2011) containing 15 items was used.
A sample item is ‘‘I dislike questions which could
be answered in many different ways,’’ (Cronbach’s
a¼ .89) answered on a 6-point Likert scale, ranging from
1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). Individual
differences in the NFC were measured to determine
the individual’s motivational strength to seek epistemic
certainty.
Results
With the method of Mahalanobis distance, one extreme
outlier with a distance of 32.79 (p¼ .001) was detected.
This outlier was removed before conducting further
data analyses.2
Examining the traditional chocolate designs parti-
cipants drew in the uncreative-cognizant condition, all
participants drew a chocolate of the shape of a cuboid.
Other shapes included sphere (81.48%), water drop
(similar to Hershey’s Kiss; 22.22%), heart (18.5%),
pyramid (18.5%), and oval (3.7%). To check if the kinds
of uncreative chocolate designs participants generated
differed as a function of the levels of their NFC and
creative ideation as well as their interaction, binary
logistic regressions on whether or not participants drew
a particular shape of chocolate (the analysis on whether
or not participants came up with the cuboid shape was
skipped because all of them generated it) were ran. All
the models were statistically insigniﬁcant, v2 (3, N¼ 27)<
3.73, ns. This conﬁrmed that the kind of chocolate designs
consensually agreed to be uncreative that were generated
by participants in the uncreative-cognizant condition
was not dependent on their levels of NFC and creative
ideation.
Square root transformation was applied to the crea-
tivity coded scores to normalize the score distribution,
before conducting a regression analysis to test the
hypothesized three-way interaction with task condition
(uncreative-cognizant vs. uncreative-incognizant), NFC
score (mean centered), ideational creative behavior score
(mean centered), and their interaction terms on the trans-
formed creativity coded scores. The overall model was
signiﬁcant, F(7, 47)¼ 2.20, p¼ .05, R2¼ .25. A margin-
ally signiﬁcant two-way interaction between NFC and
creative ideation was found (b¼.49, t(47)¼1.93,
p¼ .06). Of import, this two-way interaction was quali-
ﬁed by the predicted three-way interaction (b¼ 1.32,
t(47)¼ 2.87, p¼ .01, g2p ¼ :15, Prep¼ .998; see Figure 1).
No other effects were signiﬁcant, t< 1.21, ns.
To understand the nature of the three-way interac-
tion, two regressions at high (one SD above mean) and
low (one SD below mean) levels of NFC were performed
separately. The task condition creative ideation inter-
action was signiﬁcant at high levels of NFC (b¼ 1.31,
t(47)¼ 2.54, p¼ .01), but did not reach signiﬁcance
at low levels of NFC (b¼.74, t(47)¼1.71, p¼ .09).
These results suggest that among high-NFC participants
(but not among low-NFC participants), the effect of
creative ideation on creative performance depends on
whether participants were made aware of the uncreative
ideas or not.
In follow-up analyses, at high levels of NFC, it was
found that when conventional designs were made
accessible, participants with higher (vs. lower) creative
ideation performed the most creatively (b¼ 1.16, t(23)¼
2.70, p¼ .01); when conventional designs were not
made accessible, participants with different levels of
creative ideation did not differ in their creative perfor-
mance (b¼.15, t(24) ¼.55, p¼ .59).
Recall that at low levels of NFC, the interaction
between task condition and creative ideation was found
to be insigniﬁcant; the effect of creative ideation on
creative performance did not appear to depend on
whether or not participants were made aware of the
2When the outlier was included, the expected three-way task
conditionNFC creative ideation interaction was still signiﬁcant
(b¼ 1.02, t(48)¼ 2.72, p¼ .01).
FIGURE 1 Chocolate design creativity coded score (square root
transformed) as a function of task condition (uncreative-incognizant
vs. uncreative-cognizant), need for cognitive closure (at 1 SD below
or above mean), and creative ideation (at 1 SD below or above mean),
Study 2. (Figure is provided in color online.)
































uncreative ideas. If there is anything, when conventional
designs were not made accessible among low-NFC
participants, creative ideation was positively associated
with creative performance (b¼ .61, t(24)¼ 2.15,
p¼ .04); when conventional designs were made access-
ible, participants performed similarly at high or low
levels of creative ideation (b¼.13, t(23)¼.41, ns).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
By bridging the person, process, and press perspectives of
creativity in an integrative paradigm, the present research
offers the ﬁrst evidence that high-NFC individuals who
are strongly motivated to seek epistemic certainty (or to
maintain high conﬁdence in their chosen solution or
course of action as correct) might not always suffer in
their creative performance. To the extent that these indi-
viduals are given the opportunity to be cognizant of
uncreative solutions to a creative generation task and that
they have the potential to act creatively, their creative per-
formance can be bolstered, probably because they are
made aware of uncreative ideas as consensually invalid
solutions and thereby they exert more efforts to arrive
at consensually valid creative ideas. Their low-NFC coun-
terparts, however, did not seem to beneﬁt from the trigger
of uncreative solutions. Adding to prior research that high
NFC is generally associated with lower creative capability
(e.g., Ip et al., 2006; Leung & Chiu, 2010), our research
has expanded the ﬁeld’s understanding of how the
potentially creative mind of high-NFC individuals can
be opened by ﬁrst alerting them to the uncreative exam-
ples and allowing their high need for attaining cognitive
closure to motivate them into seeking creative ideas.
Our ﬁndings that high-NFC individuals could over-
come their tendency to seize and freeze on early uncrea-
tive ideas and perform creatively after they are made
aware of uncreative ideas has one interesting implication.
It might hint at the possibility that these individuals
could arrive at creative solutions through the persistence
route. According to the dual pathway model to creativity
proposed by De Dreu, Baas, and Nijstad (2008), two
qualitatively different processes may result in creativity:
the ﬂexibility pathway and the persistence pathway (see
also De Dreu et al., 2008). The ﬂexibility pathway leads
to creative problem solving by overcoming functional
ﬁxedness and facilitating new connections among
seemingly distant ideas. The persistence pathway, on
the other hand, focuses on approaching creative
solutions through hard work and constant systematic
probing of alternative ideas. After being cognizant of
uncreative solutions, high-NFC individuals might focus
their attention to persistently search for alternative
solutions until reaching one that they perceive as
a normatively prescribed creative answer. Future research
can explore the differential roles of cognitive ﬂexibility
and cognitive persistence in facilitating the creative
potential of individuals with high levels of NFC.
In a related vein, cognitive persistence displayed by
high-NFC individuals might manifest in their search
for speciﬁc closure. According to Kruglanski (1990,
2004), there are two types of motivating closure: nonspe-
ciﬁc and speciﬁc closure. The need for nonspeciﬁc closure
motivates an individual to freeze on any unambiguous
and ﬁrm knowledge about an issue, irrespective of the
knowledge content. The need for speciﬁc closure, on the
other hand, motivates an individual to seek out a speciﬁc
piece of knowledge required to stop information search.
In this light, it is probable that when high-NFC indivi-
duals are led to recognize those uncreative traditional
chocolate designs, they are motivated to seek speciﬁc
closure and go down the persistence pathway to continue
with their creative productions.
Finally, our ﬁndings also speak to when and for whom
activating existing ideas in creative productions could
boost creative performance. Research on design ﬁxation
showed that making old ideas or examples accessible
before people engage in creative generations is detrimental
to the idea’s creative quality (e.g., Perttula & Liikkanen,
2006; Smith, 2003; Smith & Blankenship, 1991; Smith,
Ward, & Schumacher, 1993). This ﬁxation effect limiting
creative quality might pan out for the low-NFC parti-
cipants, as they did not seem to beneﬁt from the trigger
of uncreative ideas relative to those with higher NFC.
Although this research has supported the hypothesis,
there are limitations that need to be acknowledged.
First, the sample across the two studies only consisted
of university undergraduate students. Although it is
unlikely that the proposed NFC mechanism of college
students differs from that of the nonstudent population,
researchers of future studies are encouraged to recruit
a nonstudent sample to further establish external
validity. Second, in both studies the main creativity task
was a newly created chocolate design task. This task was
developed in order to have a relatively more objective
way of assessing creativity, with raters independently
coding each drawing according to the same set of ques-
tions to produce a composite creativity score. Although
Study 1 had conﬁrmed the task’s discriminant and
convergent validities, more extensive usage of the task
in future studies is required to extend its reliability and
validity evidence. Third, another direction for future
research is to generalize the current ﬁndings to other
creative idea generation tasks. The chocolate design task
was developed to create a context to help individuals
cognize uncreative or traditional designs (or not). It
would be interesting to adapt existing creativity tasks
(e.g., generating new uses of a brick in the Unusual Uses
Test; Torrance, 1974) and alert individuals to uncreative
examples (e.g., using bricks to build walls) before
































engaging them in creative generations. This will attest to
the generalizability of current ﬁndings by examining the
same hypothesis in another creativity task context.
In conclusion, although previous research has shown
that individuals with a strong need to seek epistemic
certainty, either chronically or situationally induced,
are generally less creative and display more cultural con-
formity, this may not be necessarily true in situations
where high-NFC individuals are led to be aware of what
constitutes consensual validity. To the extent that they
are able to recognize uncreative solutions as consensually
invalid solutions, their mental set can be lifted to recon-
sider more creative alternatives. Setting out as the ﬁrst to
test this hypothesis, the current research has also tested
the applicability and utility of the integrated framework
of the person, process, and press perspectives in the
psychological study of creativity. Future research can
begin to extend the current ﬁndings to other creative
tasks and to the different stages of creative productions
(e.g., idea generation vs. idea selection).
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